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Missed (Inter)Connections: Proposed Revisions to the
Federal Reserve's Approach to Financial Stability
Analysis Under the Bank Holding Company Act
I. INTRODUCTION

Few topics in the post-financial crisis period have garnered
more high-level attention than has the management of systemic risk in
the U.S. and global financial systems.' The financial crisis of 2008
forced U.S. policy makers to revisit fundamental assumptions about the
nature of systemic risk in the modem and interconnected economy.2 On
July 21, 2011, former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bemanke testified
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.3
Seated alongside John Walsh and Gary Gensler, the acting Comptroller
of the Currency and the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), respectively, these three men represented the
regulatory bodies currently responsible for systemic-risk mitigation in
the U.S. banking industry. Chairman Bemanke opened his testimony by
saying that the global financial crisis sent "shock waves through the
highly interconnected global financial system" and that the United
States had implemented a macroprudential regulatory framework for
combating systemic risk in the new economy.
Chairman Bemanke's July 21, 2011, testimony reflects just how
far the United States' management of banking sector systemic risk has
evolved over the course of the twentieth century. Prior to the 2008
financial crisis, systemic risk regulation operated under the theory that
1. See THE GRP. OF TWENTY, THE G-20 TORONTO SUMMIT DECLARATION 4-5 (2010)
(articulating four pillars that should drive global financial policy in the wake of the financial
crisis); see generally THE GRP. OF THIRTY, FIN. REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FIN. STABILITY
17 (2009) (releasing a framework committed to systemic risk containment and the general
health of the financial system).
2. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer ProtectionAct of 2010:
HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & UrbanAffairs, 112th Cong. 1-4 (2011)
[hereinafter Bernanke Statement] (statement of Ben Bemanke, Chairman, U.S. Federal
Reserve).
3. See id.
4. Id. at 1.
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institutional supervision-the regulation of individual banks to the
exclusion of market regulation-would capture all risk in the system
because supervision of the parts would add up to supervision of the
whole.5 Because the interconnectivity of complex and fractured
banking institutions drives modem systemic risk in the banking sector,6
modem financial stability regulation has been marked by the shift from
microprudential regulation to macroprudential regulation-a framework
which seeks to capture risk at the market level.7 The macroprudential
approach, commentators reason, gives regulators a larger toolkit with
which to mitigate systematic risk in the increasingly interconnected
bank and bank holding company (BHC) context.
Accordingly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) instructs the Federal Reserve to
mitigate bank-specific systemic risk under an expansive framework9
when assessing bank mergers and acquisitions under the Bank Holding

5. See Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional "Safety and
Soundness" to "Systemic Stability" in Financial Supervision 5 (Cornell Law Faculty
Working Papers, Working Paper No. 108, 2013) ("Microprudential supervision of all parts
of the system would sum up to supervision of the system itself.").
6. Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to
RegulatingFinancialMarkets, 3 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 881, 903 (2013) ("Systemic risk concerns
arise because the banking industry is inextricably interconnected."); see Iman Anabtawi &
Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1349, 1403 (2011) (arguing that a firm's systemic importance is a
function of (1) the extent of the firm's direct importance to other market participants; and
(2) the extent of the firm's indirect importance to other market participants).
7. See Claudio Borio, Rediscovering the Macroeconomic Roots of FinancialStability
Policy: Journey, Challenges, and a Way Forward 6 (Bank for Int'l Settlements Working
Papers, Working Paper No. 354, 2011) ("Analytically, efforts have intensified to improve
the measurement and understanding of systemic risk and to include a financial sector in
macroeconomic models. This shift is belated and welcome.").
8. See Hockett, supra note 5, at 33-36 (describing the risk management tools available
to U.S. regulators under a macroprudential framework); see also Brent J. Horton, When
Does A Non-Bank FinancialCompany Pose A "Systemic Risk"? A Proposalfor Clarifying
Dodd-Frank, 37 J. CORP. L. 815, 820-27 (2012) (detailing the systemic risk from 19331982, 1982-2010, and 2010-2012); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193,
193-99 (2008) (discussing a bank run as the manifestation of systemic risk in the 1930s and
then describing how today's systemic risk manifestation is far more complex).
9. See e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank), 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012); see generally Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar,
That Which We Call A Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation
in the United States, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 113, 114 (2011) ("[Dodd-Frank], widely
viewed as the most far reaching financial sector reform legislation since the Great
Depression, expands the model of BHC regulation as the core element in its new
architecture of systemic risk regulation.").
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Company Act (BHCA).10 In this light, regulators must not only assess
risk factors within institutions, but risk factors presented by the
connections between institutions." However, the Federal Reserve's
orders under the BHCA demonstrate that the Federal Reserve's ex ante
financial stability framework has yet to appropriately account for the
role that institutional interconnectivity plays in systemic risk creation.12
This Note will argue that the Federal Reserve's financial
stability analysis under the BHCA demonstrates that even though the
Federal Reserve has adopted a regulatory framework ostensibly
committed to risk assessment at institutional linkage points, the Federal
Reserve's financial stability analysis does not appropriately address
interconnectivity in two key respects. First, the Federal Reserve's
explicit treatment of "interconnectedness" under BHCA may overlook
systemic risk associated with small, but interconnected banks and
BHCs.
Second, the Federal Reserve's implicit treatment of
interconnectedness under the BHCA, as evidenced by its traditional,
institution-centric systemic risk standards, do not capture risk associated
with interconnectivity as effectively as market-based measures of risk.
Ultimately, this Note will suggest that the Federal Reserve's approach
to financial stability under the BHCA should be revised to address the
explicit and implicit weaknesses regarding interconnectedness.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II of this Note provides an
overview of systemic risk.' 3 Part III examines the current limitations of
the Federal Reserve's Explicit Considerations of Interconnectedness in
Financial Stability Analysis Under the BHCA. 14 Part IV of this Note
analyzes the implicit assumptions concerning interconnectivity in
Federal Reserve's application of macroprudential principles under the
BHCA.' 5 Part V of this Note offers recommendations and concludes.16

10.

12 U.S.C. § 1843.
See e.g. BOARD OF

GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYSTEM, VOL. 98 No. 5, ORDERS
ISSUED UNDER BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT 24-27 (2012) [hereinafter CAPITAL ONE
11.

ORDER] (approving Capital One's acquisition of Sharebuilder Advisors, LLC & ING Direct
Investing, Inc.).
12. See id. at 24-27.
13. See infra Part Il.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra PartV.
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II. SYSTEMIC RISK: AN OVERVIEW

Traditionally, bank-based systemic risk grew from the threat
that a spike in depositor withdrawal demands would deplete available
deposit reserves, seen most notably during the Great Depression.17
Maturity mismatch crippled depository institutions because consumer
deposits were immediately callable, whereas bank loans funded by
consumer deposits tended to be non-callable.' 8 In this kind of a
liquidity crunch, a stressed bank may be forced to close-temporarily or
permanently.1 9 Regulators feared that a bank run on one institution
would create the perception that similarly-situated institutions were at
risk. 20 This perception bred a destructive form of financial contagion;
one that presented in the form of a "recursive collective action
problem." 2 1 This collective problem compelled individual depositors,
powerless to halt a run, to conclude that the personal utility of
withdrawing savings from the bank far outweighed the collective
benefits of abstention.22 With President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's
help, Congress tackled the recursive collective action problem and
created the FDIC in 1933 to insure deposit accounts.2 3 This measure
shored up confidence in individual institutions and mitigated the
recursive collective action problem bred by the fear that a maturity
mismatch would ultimately lead to system-wide insolvency.2 4 It is fair
17. See Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 199 ("The classic example of systemic risk in this
context is a "bank run," in which the inability of a bank to satisfy withdrawal-demands
causes its failure, in turn causing other banks or their creditors to fail.").
18. See id. ("Because banks keep only a small fraction of their deposits on hand as cash
reserves, a bank may have insufficient cash to pay all withdrawal-demands, causing it to
default and ultimately fail.").
19. See id.
20. See id. ("The chain of subsequent failures can occur because banks are closely
intertwined financially.").
21. See Hockett, supra note 5, at 6.
22. See id. ("To hold off, after all, is simply to risk losing everything; for no one
abstainer can stop the run by refusing to participate any more than she could singlehandedly stop a consumer price inflation by refraining from purchasing.").
23. See William L. Silber, Why Did FDR's Bank Holiday Succeed?, 15 EcON. POLICY.
J. 19, 21 (2009) ("FDIC insurance caps its guarantee at a maximum dollar amount for each
deposit account, initially set at $2,500. Small depositors with FDIC insurance did not have
to worry about their accounts, but large depositors, who were only partially insured, could
still be panicked into a run. Roosevelt's implicit 100 percent guarantee on March 12, 1933,
convinced all depositors to trust the reopened banks.").
24. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Keynote Address at the Cornell International Law Journal Symposium: The Changing
Politics Of Central Banks 2
(Feb.
22,
2013)
(transcript available at
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to conclude that Congress' first major microprudential enactment-the
FDIC-was an unqualified success. 25
A fundamental difference between systemic risk at the time of
the Great Depression and systemic risk today is not necessarily the
source of risk.26 Rather, it is the extent of interconnectivity between
institutions both in the United States and abroad.27 Even today,
financial institutions are increasingly interconnected,2 8 and greater
interconnectivity creates more opportunities for financial contagion
transmission. 29
Modem systemic risk is a concept with numerous definitions.30
The literature is consistent in at least one respect: modem systemic risk
is fundamentally relational. 3 ' The various definitions recognize that
risk occurs as a function of the relationships between institutions, and as
Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen recently said, "[c]ontagion is

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20l30222a.pdf) ("The New Deal
reforms of financial regulation, themselves spawned by a systemic crisis, had separated
commercial banking from investment banking, cured the problem of commercial bank runs
by providing federal deposit insurance . . . ."). It is important to note that the pre and postfinancial crisis systemic risks are not entirely dissimilar, and the threat of a bank run still
exists today. See Hockett, supra note 5, at 5-6 (describing liquidity crunches brought about
by bank runs, a collective action problem "to which financial systems historically appear to
be prone").
25. See Tarullo, supra note 24, at 5.
26. Maturity mismatch today remains a source of risk. See Emmanuel Farhi & Jean
Tirole, Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts 37-38 (Nat.
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15138, 2009) (arguing that "increased
maturity mismatch" may sow the seeds of the next financial crisis).
27. See Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 249 ("Because finance and markets are globally
interconnected, systemic collapse in one country inevitably will affect markets and
institutions in other countries.").
28. See Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir., Int'l Monetary Fund, The Interconnected
Global Economy: Challenges and Opportunities for the United States-and the World,
Address before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Sept. 19, 2013) (describing a "world of
increasing economic interconnections").
29. Janet L. Yellen, Vice-Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks
at the American Economic Association/American Finance Association Joint Luncheon:
Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk: Lessons from the Financial Crisis and Policy
at
available
(transcript
2013)
4,
(Jan.
9
Implications
("Contagion is
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20130104a.htm)
significantly more likely at higher levels of connectivity.").
30. See Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 194-98 (noting commonly cited definitions of
systemic risk).
31. See id. at 198 ("A common factor in the various definitions of systemic risk is that
a trigger event, such as an economic shock or institutional failure, causes a chain of bad
economic consequences-sometimes referred to as a domino effect.").
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significantly more likely at higher levels of connectivity."3 2
Accordingly, in the banking context, institutions or groups of connected
institutions are or can be considered risky in one of two scenarios: (1)
an individual firm which is so large and so interconnected that the size
of its systemic footprint makes it an inherent threat to financial stability;
or (2) small but sufficiently connected firms that their actions in concert
can pose a threat to financial stability.3 3 Under the BHCA, the Federal
Reserve appropriately accounts for the first category. However, the
financial stability framework is poised to overlook the risk that small
but sufficiently interconnected firms can pose to the U.S. financial
system.

III. EXPLICIT CONSIDERATIONS OF INTERCONNECTEDNESS IN FINANCIAL
STABILITY ANALYSIS UNDER THE BHCA
As commentators and regulators grappled with the fallout of the
recent global financial crisis, a consensus emerged that increased
interconnectivity will continue to drive risk in global financial
markets. 34 Accordingly, when Dodd-Frank amended the BHCA to
require the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (the Board) to "assess
risk to the stability of the U.S. banking or financial system" 35 while
considering a BHC's proposal to acquire a nonbank,3 6 the Federal
32.

Yellen, supra note 29, at 9.

33.

See MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL

REGULATION 25-26 (International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies ed. 2009)
(detailing a four-part classification system for all organizations in the financial space; two of
which directly implicate banks).
34. See, e.g., K.C. Chakrabarty, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Crisis
Preparedness in Interconnected Markets-Prevention is Better than Cure, Keynote Address
at the Programme on Crisis Preparedness in Interconnected Markets Held by the Centre for
Advanced Fin. Research and Learning and the Toronto Centre 1 (Jan. 16, 2012) ("The
increasing interconnectedness of global markets, economies and institutions have only
added to the potential of a crisis anywhere in the world to trigger contagion in the rest of the
world.").
35. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 12
U.S.C. §1843(j)(2)(A) (2012); see also 12 C.F.R. § 225.20-28; see also CAPITAL ONE
ORDER, supra note 11, at 23 (approving Capital One's acquisition of Sharebuilder Advisors,
LLC & ING Direct Investing, Inc.) ("The Dodd-Frank Act added "risk to the stability of the
United States banking or financial system" to the list of possible adverse effects that the
Board must weigh against any expected public benefits in considering proposals under
section 4(j) of the BHC Act.").
36. The rules detailing whether a BHC may purchase a nonbank are promulgated in
Federal Reserve Regulation Y. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.20-29. Regulation Y is the Federal
Reserve's interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 1843, and details exemptions to the BHCA's general
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Reserve interpreted that mandate as requiring explicit considerations of
"interconnectedness." 3 7
In the years before Dodd-Frank, the Board was not required to
consider the impact that a proposed acquisition would have on the
stability of the financial system. 38 Under § 1843, systemic risk or
financial stability analysis requires that the Board project to the future
and assess whether the proposed acquisition will have an "adverse
effect" 39 on the economy by posing a "risk to the stability of the United
States or financial system." 40 In this posture, the Board
expects that it will generally find a significant adverse
effect if the failure of the resulting firm, or its inability
to conduct regular-course-of-business transactions,
would likely impair financial intermediation or financial
market functioning so as to inflict material damage on
the broadereconomy. 41
The Board recognizes that material damage to financial markets
could occur in any number of ways. 42 The Board gives the following
examples: (1) "seriously compromising the ability of other financial
institutions to conduct regular-course-of-business transactions[;]" 43 or
(2) "seriously disrupting the provision of credit or other financial
services."4 However, consistent with the competing modem concepts
of systemic risk, the Board does not limit itself to a strict set of metrics
and takes into consideration all the relevant factors in a particular

prohibition that a BHC may not "acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any
voting shares of any company which is not a bank or a bank holding company." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843 (j)(2)(A) (2011) (emphasis added). These exemptions allow a BHC to own
companies whose activities are "closely related to banking," 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8), or if
the BHC has qualified for and been designated as a Financial Holding Company (FHC) by
the Board, activities that are "financial in nature." 12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(4).
37. See generally CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11 at 29 (approving Capital One's
acquisition of Sharebuilder Advisors, LLC & ING Direct Investing, Inc.).
38. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012).
39. Id.; see also CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 24-27 (approving Capital
One's acquisition of Sharebuilder Advisors, LLC & ING Direct Investing, Inc.).
40.

CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 23.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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transaction.45
The Board measures the risk a resulting firm will pose to the
health of the financial system both quantitatively and qualitatively. 46
The Board evaluates a BHC's proposal to purchase a nonbank using at
least five quantitative metrics: (1) size; 4 7 (2) substitutability; 4 8 (3)
interconnectedness; 49 (4) complexity;50 and (5) cross-border activity.51
The ultimate measure of financial stability is derived from an analysis
of these "factors in combination."5 2 That is, the Board will assess these
financial stability factors in the aggregate.5 3
Under the Board's financial stability analysis, size appears to be
the single most important factor in determining whether the resulting
firm will pose a material threat to the health of the U.S. or global
financial systems. 54 When the size of the resulting firm is less than $25
billion, the Federal Reserve presumes that the new firm will not raise
financial stability concerns.55 Under the Brunnermeier framework,56
which argues that systemic risk can flow from either the immense size
of an individual institution or by the interconnectivity of similarlysituated small firms, 57 the BHCA appropriately acknowledges the role

45. Id. at 23 n. 72.
CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 24.
47. Id. at 24-25 ("An organization's size is one important indicator of the risk that the
organization poses to the financial system.").
48. Id. at 25-26 ("The Board has examined whether Capital One or FSB engages in any
activities that are critical to the functioning of the USFS and whether there would be
adequate substitute providers that could quickly step in to perform such activities should the
combined entity suddenly be unable to do so as a result of severe financial distress.").
49. Id. at 26 ("The Board has examined data to determine whether financial distress
experienced by the combined entity could create financial instability by being transmitted to
any other institutions or markets within the U.S. banking or financial system.").
50. Id. at 26-27 ("The Board has considered the extent to which the combined entity
would contribute to the overall complexity of the USFS.").
51. Id. at 27 ("The Board has examined the cross-border activities of Capital One and
FSB to determine whether the cross-border presence of the combined organization would
create difficulties in coordinating any resolution, thereby significantly increasing the risk to
U.S. financial stability.").
52. CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 27.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 24-27.
55. Id. at 24 ("[A] proposal that involves an acquisition of less than $2 billion in assets,
results in a firm with less than $25 billion in total assets ... may be presumed not to raise
financial stability concerns.")
46.

56.

See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supranote 33, at 25-26.

57. See id.
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that size plays in the calculus of systemic risk management.
Under
the BHCA, for example, the Federal Reserve's financial stability
analysis acknowledges that size is a "helpful indicator[] of systemic
risk" because size must also be attributed to "systemic impact of a
transaction." 59
It does not appear that the Federal Reserve's analysis under
interconnectedness captures the risk of small firms operating in
concert. 60 The Federal Reserve's interconnectedness analysis in Capital
One61 focuses on the resulting firm's relationship not to other similarlysituated actors within the system, but rather calls attention to the
resulting firm's "use of wholesale funding, as a share of USFS
wholesale funding usage" and the resulting firm's share of "intrafinancial system assets and liabilities" 62 -indicators which measure the
firm's interconnectedness in terms of relative capital use against the
market as a whole. The recent financial crisis demonstrated that 100
highly-correlated small firms can pose just as must danger to the system
as a single large entity.63 Without amendment, this approach runs the
risk of missing important linkages, especially among smaller,
interconnected institutions whose systemic risk is not flagged because
they do not exceed the BHCA's $25 billion size threshold.6 As the
financial crisis made clear, "[c]ontagion can be transmitted from small
or large financial institutions" 65 and the Federal Reserve's
interconnectivity analysis should begin to explicitly consider the
resulting firm's place as a member "of a herd" 66 and not merely in
relation to the market, writ large.

58. See id. 25-26.
59.
60.

CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 25.
See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 33, at 25-26.

61. CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 7-32 (approving Capital One's acquisition
of Sharebuilder Advisors, LLC & ING Direct Investing, Inc.).
62. Id. at 25.
63. Markus Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, Bubbles, FinancialCrises, and Systemic
Risk, in 2B HANDBOOK OF THE ECON. OF FIN. 1221, 1273 (George Constantinides et al. eds.,
2013) ("[A] group of 100 institutions that act in a correlated fashion can be as dangerous to
the system as one large entity.").
64. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 33, at 25-26.
65. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42150, SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT OR
"Too BIG TO FAIL" FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 4 (2013).
66. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 33, at 25-26.
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IV. THE IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING INTERCONNECTIVITY IN
THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S APPLICATION OF MACROPRUDENTIAL
PRINCIPLES UNDER THE BHCA
Just as the Federal Reserve's treatment of interconnectivity
under the BHCA requires revision on account of the systemic risk posed
by small institutions, the implicit assumptions that underlie the Federal
Reserve's macroprudential policies also suggest that the Federal
Reserve needs to revise its approach to financial stability analysis under
§ 1843. In July 2011, Chairman Bernanke stated the Federal Reserve's
definition and approach to macroprudential policy. Before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, he testified that
the macroprudential approach "supplements traditional supervision and
regulation of individual firms or markets with explicit consideration of
threats to the stability of the financial system as a whole."6 7
Macroprudential regulation casts a wide net, but its most
common usage contemplates policy packages of institutionally-focused
and market-focused systemic risk management measures.6 8 The term
"macroprudential" in the banking context can be traced back to the
1970s in limited usage.6 9
Macroprudential theories only gained
widespread academic attention after the financial crisis.70 Today, all of
the world's developed economies have enacted macroprudential
regulatory reforms.n While there appears to be general consensus
among policy makers and commentators that some form of a
macroprudential framework appropriately responds to the regulatory

67. See Bernanke Statement, supra note 2, at 2.
68. See, e.g., id. at 1-2 ("[T]he United States and other developed economies have
instructed central banks and regulatory agencies to adopt what has been called a
macroprudential approach to supervision and regulation-that is, an approach that
supplements traditional supervision and regulation of individual firms or markets with
explicit consideration of threats to the stability of the financial system as a whole.").
69. See Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, MacroprudentialPolicy-a Literature
Review 4 (Bank for Int'l Settlements Working Papers, Working Paper No. 337, 2011)
("[T]he origin of the term 'macroprudential' can be traced back to unpublished documents
prepared in the late 1970s .... .").
70. See id. at 5 (detailing the post-financial crisis macroprudential literature and
charting the dramatic increase of the word "macroprudential" in economics academic papers
after 2008).
71. See Hockett, supra note 5, at 3 ("[S]ome 50 jurisdictions, including all of the
world's most developed economies, have formally adopted macroprudential financeregulatory measures since early 2009.").
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challenges of the modem financial system, 72 these groups continue to
debate the appropriate blend of institutional and market-based strategies
within the calculus of macroprudential systemic risk management.7 3
In the United States and abroad, roughly two camps have
emerged. In the first, the majority of commentators and academics
advocate for the implementation of market-centric macroprudential
regulations.74 A core argument among this group of scholars is that
systemic risk monitoring and assessment that weighs institutional
measures of risk more heavily than market measures will miss critical
indicators of systemic weaknesses,75 and regulators should adopt a top
down regulatory model that privileges market risk ahead of institutional
risk.7 6 In the second group, the majority of central banks prioritize a
bottom-up, "single institution risk models,",7 and market-based
measures supplement the institutional approach.7 8 While "there is a
growing consensus among policy makers that a macroprudential
approach to regulation and supervision should be adopted," 79 nearly 60
percent of all central banks privilege the stability of institutions over the
stability of markets. 80 Chairman Bernanke's testimony that market72. See Borio, supra note 7, at 12 (arguing that "[m]onitoring and limited systemic risk
is now a core policy objective" of the international community).
73. See id. at 6 (arguing that the market metrics should superseded the institutional
metrics); see also Bernanke Statement, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the macroprudential
approach "supplements traditional supervision and
regulation of individual firms or markets with explicit consideration of threats to the
stability of the financial system as a whole").
74. See generally Galati & Moessner, supra note 69 (detailing the divergent discourse
concerning macroprudential policy among commentators and policy makers); see generally
Borio, supra note 7 (arguing that a market-centric macroprudential framework for systemic
risk management is preferable to an institution centric macroprudential framework).
75. See, e.g., Hockett, supra note 5, at 4 ("[S]tructural vulnerabilities ... ,both in the
transactional relations among banks and depositors and in the legal characteristics of
demand deposit claims-that the institutional focus of traditional microprudential
regulations tends especially to miss."); see generally Galati & Moessner, supra note 69
(detailing the divergent discourse concerning macroprudential policy among commentators
and policy makers).
76. See generally Galati & Moessner, supra note 69.
77.

INT'L MONETARY FUND, MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY: AN ORGANIZING FRAMEWORK

3 (2011) [hereinafter IMF FRAMEWORK].
78. See id.
79. Galati & Moessner, supra note 69 (detailing the divergent discourse concerning
macroprudential policy among commentators and policy makers); see, e.g., Hockett, supra
note 5, at 4 ("[S]tructural vulnerabilities . . . , both in the transactional relations among
banks and depositors and in the legal characteristics of demand deposit claims-that the
institutional focus of traditional microprudential regulations tends especially to miss.");
80. See generally IMF FRAMEWORK, supra note 77 (laying out results of 2011
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based consideration should "supplement" 8' demonstrates that the former
chairman ascribed to the institution-centric version of macroprudential
policy.82 Institution-centric macroprudential policy, unfortunately, does
not capture systemic risk posed by the interconnections between banks
and other financial institutions as effectively as a market-centric
macroprudential framework. 83
A.

The InstitutionalApproach to Systemic Risk Management

The institutional approach to systemic risk mitigation
emphasizes polices which seek to regulate individual financial
institutions.84 This approach, administered properly, operates under the
theory of action that the comprehensive regulation of the parts equals
the comprehensive regulation of the entire system.85 The typical
microprudential policy seeks to limit distress of individual institutions
and assumes that risk flows up from the weaknesses of individual
institutions.86
The interconnected nature of the modem financial system,
commentators argue, challenges the capacity of the institutional
approach. First, the institutional approach does not capture activities
at institutional linkage points as effectively as market-based
measurement.88 A lens focused on institutions alone will focus on the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) survey of international implementation of
macroprudential policies).
8 1. See Bernanke Statement, supra note 2, at 2.
82. See Bernanke Statement, supra note 2, at 2.
83. See infra Part Ill.
84. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 884. ("To mitigate systemic risk concerns, or
concerns that a systemically significant financial institution or a chain of financial

institutions may fail, state and federal regulators have historically relied on prudential
regulation.").
85. Hockett, supra note 5, at 5; see Borio, supra note 7, at 7.
86. See e.g. Bernanke Statement, supra note 2, at 1-2 ("[T]he United States and other
developed economies have instructed central banks and regulatory agencies to adopt what
has been called a macroprudential approach to supervision and regulation-that is, an
approach that supplements traditional supervision and regulation of individual firms or
markets with explicit consideration of threats to the stability of the financial system as a
whole.").
87. See, e.g., Hockett, supra note 5, at 5 ("Were a financial system none but the sum of
its parts, there would be no need to distinguish between micro- and macroprudential foci.
Microprudential supervision of all parts of the system would sum up to supervision of the
system itself. A financial system, however, appears to be more than the sum of its parts.").
88. See Id.
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trees at the expense of the forest,8 9 and will "miss important source[s] of
risk over time." 90 For example, the institutional approach tended to
overemphasize the importance of capital constraints at the expense of
liquidity constraints. 91 While both are intended to "enhance the
resistance to shocks of financial systems," 92 liquidity requirements,
commentators argued, were "fundamentally a general equilibrium
concept," and forestalled financial contagion as effectively as did
institution-centric capital requirements. 93 Because sales of assets when
the market is less than perfectly elastic can depress asset prices (as in
the classic fire-sale model 94), sales in response to market shocks
perpetuate a shock. 95 Thus, one way to curtail systemic contagion is
"by requiring banks to maintain prudent levels of liquidity." 96
Second, the financial crisis challenged the prevailing
assumption that the regulation of the parts equaled the regulation of the
whole. 97 Just as the financial crisis demonstrated the importance of
active liquidity regulation, it also demonstrated the importance of
regulation above and beyond short-term interest rate management. 98
Pre-crisis monetary policy and co-extensive microprudential policy
operated under the flawed assumption that central banks would never
need to drive interest rates to nearly zero in part because "price stability
[was] sufficient for macroeconomic stability." 99
It was also
89. See Hockett, supra note 5, at 26 ("One is that the microprudential authority might
be so habituated to the microprudential task as to be unable, absent significant retraining, to
transition into the habit of seeing the proverbial 'forest through the trees.').
90. Hockett, supra note 5, at 12.
91. See Borio, supra note 7, at 3 (arguing that "[t]he emphasis that prudential
regulation placed on capital rather than liquidity constraints" was "paradoxical" and against
the weight of the literature.").
92. See Rodrigo Cifuentes, Gianluigi Ferrucci, & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity Risk and
Contagion, (Apr. 2, 2004) availableat http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/rtf04shin.pdf.
93. Borio, supra note 7, at 8.
94. David VanHoose, Systemic Risks and Macroprudential Bank Regulation: A
Critical Appraisal,

33

J.

OF

FIN.

TRANSFORMATION,

Nov.

2011,

at

49,

http://www.capco.com/capco-institute/capco-journal/journal-33-technical-finance/systemicrisks-and-macroprudential-bank-r.
95. See Rodrigo Cifuentes et al., Liquidity Risk and Contagion, 3 J. OF THE EUROPEAN
ECON. ASS'N. 556, 556 (2005) ("Forced sales of assets may feed back on market volatility
and produce a downward spiral in asset prices, which in turn may affect adversely other
financial institutions.").
96. Id.
97. See Hockett, supra note 5 ("Microprudential supervision of all parts of the system
would sum up to supervision of the system itself.").
98. See Borio, supra note 7, at 9.
99. Id. at 9.
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inconceivable that central banks would need to inject enormous sums of
capital to thaw frozen capital markets.' 00
The sum impact of the increasingly interconnected marketplace
and the recognition that the regulation of the parts does not equal the
regulation of the whole, commentators argue, requires institutional and
market-based regulation.' 0 1 Unfortunately, at the start of the financial
crisis, tools that measured risk from a top-down, market perspective
were unavailable.102
B.

The Market-BasedApproach to Systemic Risk Management

Market-based systemic risk management mitigates bankoriginated systemic risk through polices that threaten the entire
marketplace. 0 3 Market measures operate under the theory that risk is
relational,1 04 and a bank's individual risk profile does not threaten the
health of the U.S. and global financial systems as would the risk profile
of institutions in concert.' 05 The paradigm policy designed to reduce
systemic risk under the market-based approach is one that "limits
system-wide distress"1 06 and "avoid[s] macroeconomic costs linked to
financial instability."' 07
Financial contagion in today's economy
models its traditional counterpart: systemic risk "describe[s] the concern
that one systemically significant financial institution may become
insolvent and initiate a cascade of losses or insolvencies across financial
markets."' 0 8
100. Id. ("But the complete seizure of the interbank market and the reach of the gridlock
in securitized credit markets, well beyond the banking sector, took observers and policy
makers by surprise.").
101. See, e.g., Hockett, supra note 5.
102. See Borio, supra note 7, at 10.
103. See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation,
Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REv. 657, 666 (2012) ("[R]egulatory efforts to
manage systemic risk must also take a 'macroprudential' approach focused on maintaining
the stability of the financial system as a whole."). But see Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald
Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations
Contributedto the Crisisof 2008, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 807, 810 (2010) (arguing that
the psychology of people within individual financial institutions caused the financial crisis).
104. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 198.
105. See id.
106. See Galati & Moessner, supra note 69, at 7.
107. See id.
108. Kristin N. Johnson, supra note 6, at 902; see also Manuel A. Utset, Complex
Financial Institutions and Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REv. 779, 791 (2011) (describing
systemic risk as "[t]he failure of a large or highly interconnected financial institution which
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The market-based approach to systemic-risk management
improves existing institutional frameworks in at least two respects.
First, the market-based approach better counters the regulatory "tragedy
of the commons."l 09 While this social sciences theory has numerous
applications, in financial markets "absent [regulatory] intervention,
financial market participants will progressively pursue their self-interest
in the form of socially excessive risk-taking."110 These conclusions are
based on the following syllogism: (1) institutions are self-serving; (2)
interconnectivity distributes risk widely; (3) the potential for selfserving gain increases even as risk is increasingly distributed; and (4)
the attendant risk/loss calculation drives risk to perhaps acceptable
levels within an institution, but to unacceptable levels systematically."'
The solution to risk mitigation in the increasingly interconnected
economy, he argues, lies in systemic regulation.112
Another core strength of the market-based approach to systemic
risk mitigation is that these strategies capture the interorganizational
linkages and regulate countercyclically more effectively than
institutional supervision.' 13 Modem banks now compete with various
non-bank sources in capital markets.114 Thus, the "markets themselves
are increasingly central to any examination of systemic risk.""'5 Given
this wider lens, macroprudential policy's great advantage over
institutional risk strategies is that it has the capacity to measure the
market and operate countercyclically." 6
The potential for countercyclical regulation also gives rise to the
can cause others to fail. Even relatively small shocks to one part of the financial system can
quickly spread to others, precipitating a crisis.").
109. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1375-76 (arguing that the dynamics of
collective action in the financial marketplace lead to an environment where firms fail to
appreciate the risk associated with such collective action).
110. Id. at 1375.
Ill. See generally, id. at 1375 (describing the relationship between increased market
interconnectivity and risk).
112. Id. at 1401.
113. See Hockett, supra note 5, at 10 ("This countercyclical form of supervisor action, it
bears emphasis, cannot be effected by traditional microprudential regulatory means aloneeither in practice or in principle.").
114. Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 200 ("Companies today are able to obtain most of their
financing through the capital markets without the use of intermediaries.").
115. Id.at3l.
116. Hockett, supra note 5, at 10 ("A-if not the-key policy objective of
macroprudential supervision is accordingly to counteract, where possible, these potentially
catastrophic self-amplification mechanism and thereby act 'countercyclically."').
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greatest challenge facing successful implementation of marketregulatory policies: they are fundamentally untested in countercyclical
application.' 1 7 Countercyclical polices during boom times will limit
profits, and will force regulators to take the likely unpopular stance of
limiting growth."' 8 Beyond issues raised directly by countercyclicality,
market-based regulation presents serious administrability issues." 9 In a
world of split-second, multi-billion dollar transfers between a BHC and
its counterparties, regulators charged with overseeing BHCs must
accurately recognize an emerging threat among a body of diverse and
voluminous transactions, and respond in an appropriate and timely
manner to that market-based threat.' 20 There may not be the will to act,
and regulatory inertia may further dampen that will.12' This "daunting
challenge" will test both regulators and the rules that define
macroprudential policies.' 22
Finally, it is sometimes difficult to draw distinctions between
market and institutional measures to mitigate systemic risk, and, in fact,
"many standard microprudential finance-regulatory tools can be
employed with some adjustment, to accomplish macroprudential
ends." 23 In this light, the macroprudential toolkit employs a range of
tools which will sometimes be regulated in light of the institution and
sometimes be regulated in light of the market as a whole.' 24 Because
117. Id. at 34 ("Of course, for so long as the U.S. . . . remains mired in macroeconomic
slump, there will be little if any occasion to test regulators willingness to use these tools to
'lean against the wind' during boom times.").
118. Id.
119. Utset, supra note 108, at 233. ("Identifying, on a timely basis, changes in the risk
profile of a group of complex institutions interacting with each other along numerous
dimensions creates much greater challenges for regulators than monitoring each of those
institutions as single, isolated entities.").
120.

See id.

121. See VANHOOSE, supra note 94, at 50 (citing William White, Econ. Adviser and
Head of Monetary and Econ. Dep't of the Bank for Int'l Settlements, Address at the LSE
Fin. Mkts. Group and Deutsche Bank Conference: Past Financial Crises, The Current
Financial Turmoil, and the Need for a New Macrofinancial Stability Framework (Mar. 8,
2008), in 4 J. FIN. STABILTY 307, at 307-12.).
122. See Utset, supra note 108, at 234 ("At the system level, therefore, regulators face a
meta-complexity problem: the complexity of groups of complex objects. This is a daunting
challenge, requiring special attention both when designing and implementing a set of legal
rules.").
123. See Hockett, supra note 5, at 4; see also Borio, supra note 7, at 7 ("Not all the
policies implemented in the wake of the financial crisis have explicitly sought to strengthen
the macroprudential orientation of regulation and supervision. In fact, a major part of the
efforts falls naturally in the traditional microprudential perspective.").
124. See Borio, supra note 7, at 7 ("Not all the policies implemented in the wake of the
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modem regulators need a diverse toolkit to battle novel presentations of
systemic risk in the U.S. and global financial systems, most policy
makers and commentators take the position that macroprudential
regulation should use institutional and market-based measures and riskmitigation strategies.12 5
C.

Applying Approaches that IntegrateInstitutional-and MarketBased Approaches to Systemic-Risk Mitigation

The integrated approach to reducing systemic risk merges the
institutional approach and the market-based approach into one
framework. 126 This approach balances "'microprudential' regulations
focused on individual

institutions [with] ...

a 'macroprudential'

approach focused on maintaining the stability of the financial system as
a whole." 1 27 The integrated approach does appear best suited to
regulation in today's highly-interconnected global economy. 128 First, an
integrated approach permits regulatory bodies to flexibly manage
financial intermediaries.1 29 Flexibility is critical because systemic risk
analysis requires consideration of the microeconomic complexities of
multi-billion (and sometimes trillion) dollar financial entities, and the
challenges are enormous. Contagion, for instance, may present
suddenly or gradually13 0 and regulators should have the flexibility to
financial crisis have explicitly sought to strengthen the macroprudential orientation of
regulation and supervision. In fact, a major part of the efforts falls naturally in the
traditional microprudential perspective.").
125. Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 202-04.
126. Id. at 202 ("Institutional systemic risk and market systemic risk therefore should
not be viewed each in isolation. Institutions and markets can be involved in both.").
127. Judge, supra note 103, at 666.
128. See Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 202-04 (describing the merits of the integrated
approach).
129. See id. at 202 ("This perspective also reveals that the business or legal
characterization of any given institution should be far less important, from the standpoint of
systemic risk, than whether such institution is, in fact, a critical financial intermediary.").
130. Testimony Concerning Regulation of Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Mary L.
at
SEC),
available
Schapiro,
Chairman,
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts072309mls.htm ("There are two different kinds
of 'systemic risk': (1) the risk of sudden. .. systemic.. .and (2) the longer-term risk that
our system will unintentionally favor large systemically important institutions over smaller,
more nimble competitors[.]); see also Traci M. Pribbenow, Back in the Saddle Again: But
Which Way Do We Go from Here? A View of Agency Suggestions for Systemic Risk
Regulation, 60 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 559, 560 (2010).
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craft ex post solutions targeted at the failing institution as well as
market-based remedies designed to soften the impact of a failed
institution. Third, interconnected relationships between institutions lie at
the heart of risk,13' and direct counterparties with heavy exposure to a
weakened BHC may further damage the broader economy by calling
loans ahead of schedule and reducing available lines of credit on the
basis of actual balance sheet need or perceived weaknesses of the target
institution. 132
While there appears to be general consensus that post-financial
crisis systemic risk should be regulated through an integrated
framework,133 a divide has emerged as to the role of traditional
institutional measures in the calculus of modem systemic-risk
management. 134 Scholarship and policy can be divided into two
approaches: (1) the widely-practiced integrated approach that prioritizes
the stability of financial institutions before the stability of the
markets;1 35 and (2) the less-widely practiced integrated approach that
prioritizes the stability of the markets before the stability of
institutions. 136

131. See Alison M. Hashmall, After the Fall: A New Framework to Regulate "Too Big
to Fail" Non-Bank FinancialInstitutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 829, 834 (2010) (stating that
contagion can contribute to bank runs on other institutions).
132. Zachary J. Gubler, Regulating in the Shadows: Systemic Moral Hazard and the
Problem of the Twenty-First Century Bank Run, 63 ALA. L. REv. 221, 221 (2012) ("An
important, emerging literature suggests that the proximate cause of the recent financial crisis
was an old-fashioned bank run of the sort that was common prior to the Great Depression.
But instead of individuals converging on the local savings and loan, this bank run involved
investment banks' short-term creditors who began withdrawing their cash from these banks
out of concern for the quality of the underlying collateral. . . .").
133. See IMF FRAMEWORK, supra note 77, at 2 ("Responses to the [IMF] survey prove a
clear indication that macroprudential policy is becoming an overarching public policy in the
wake of the global financial crisis.").
134. See, e.g. Borio, supra note 7, at 7 (arguing that market metrics should supersede
institutional metrics); contra Bernanke Statement, supra note 2, at 2 (arguing that
macroprudential polices should supplement traditional policies).
135. See Hockett, supra note 5, at 4; see also Borio, supra note 7, at 7 ("Not all the
policies implemented in the wake of the financial crisis have explicitly sought to strengthen
the macroprudential orientation of regulation and supervision. In fact, a major part of the
efforts falls naturally in the traditional microprudential perspective.").
136. See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation,
Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REv. 657, 666 (2012) ("[R]egulatory efforts to
manage systemic risk must also take a 'macroprudential' approach focused on maintaining
the stability of the financial system as a whole.")
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1. The Integrated Approach That Places the Institution Before the
Market
An integrated approach to systemic risk that prioritizes
institutional stability over market stability operates under the theory that
institutional risk drives systemic risk, but concedes that market-focused
risk mitigation is still necessary.'3 7 The majority of international
financial regulators apply a form of the integrated approach that values
institutional stability over the stability of the market,' 3 8 and this
approach to macroprudential policy employs institutional tools to
mitigate systemic risk, and will complement that tool kit with market-

focused tools.'

39

For example, the newly-created Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) is a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to protect financial
stability in the domestic and global financial systems.1 40 FSOC's
macroprudential priorities are: (1) "[e]nhancing the resiliency of a firm
to lower the probability of its failure or inability to serve as a financial
intermediary;"'41 and (2) "[r]educing the impact on the financial system
and the broader economy in the event of a firm's failure or material
weakness." 42 This rhetoric encompasses much of the institution-first
language because it demonstrates that the FSOC operates under the
theory of action that institutional stability will equate to market
137.

See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BOARD, INT'L MONETARY FUND, AND BANK FOR INT'L

SETTLEMENTS, MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY TOOLS AND FRAMEWORKS: UPDATE TO THE G20
FIN. MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS 2 (2011) [hereinafter UPDATE TO THE G20]
("We define macroprudential policy as a policy that uses primarily prudential tools to limit
systematic or system-wide financial risk, thereby limiting the incidence of disruptions in the
provision of key financial services that can have serious consequences for the real
economy.").
138. See generally IMF FRAMEWORK, supra note 77 (laying out results of 2011
International Monetary Fund (IMF) survey of international implementation of
macroprudential policies).
139. See UPDATE TO THE G20, supra note 137, at 2 ("We define macroprudential policy
as a policy that uses primarily prudential tools to limit systematic or system-wide financial
risk, thereby limiting the incidence of disruptions in the provision of key financial services
that can have serious consequences for the real economy.").
140. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 12
U.S.C. § 5322 (2012) (creating the Financial Stability Oversight Council responsible for
"identify[ing] risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the
material financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank
holding companies or nonbank financial companies, or that could arise outside the financial
services marketplace.").
141. FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 111 (2013).
142. Id.
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stability.143
2. An Integrated Approach That Places the Market Before the Institution
An integrated approach that prioritizes market stability over
institutional stability operates under the theory that risk lies in the
linkages between institutions, but concedes that institution-focused
policies are necessary.144 Claudio Borio, the Bank for International
Settlement's Monetary and Economic Development head, stands on the
leading edge of this movement.145 He wrote that macroprudential
regulation
means calibrating [regulation] from a system-wide or
systemic perspective, rather than from that of the safety
and soundness of individual institutions on a stand-alone
basis. It means following a top-down approach, working
out the desirable safety standard for the system as a
whole and, from there, deriving that of the individual
institutions within it. 146
The emphasis on the "top down" approach effectively captures
the position of other commentators who support the market first and
institution second approach to systemic risk management. 1 47 Increased
interconnectedness through the proliferation of diverse nonbank
financial intermediaries drives the scholarship proffering a marketcentric regulatory framework because of the broad diversity of
intermediaries operating in capital markets.148

143. See CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 24-27.
144. See generally Claudio Borio, Implementing a Macroprudential Framework:
Blending Boldness and Realism, CAPITALISM AND Soc'Y 2 (January 2011),
http://capitalism.columbia.edu/volume-6-issue- 1.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 6 (arguing that the market-first; institution-second approach is "top-down");
see also Charles K. Whitehead, Refraning FinancialRegulation, 90 B.U. L. REv. 1, 6
(2010).
148. Whitehead, supra note 147 ("Financial risk may increasingly be bought and sold
among capital markets participants, some of whom are not subject to the same levels of
regulation as traditional intermediaries.").
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D. The Board'sFinancialStability Analysis Under the BHCA Reflects
an Institution-FirstApproach to Systemic Risk Management

The majority of international financial regulators practice a form
of the integrated approach that values institutional stability over the
stability of the market,149 and the Federal Reserve is no exception.' 5 0
Dodd-Frank amended the BHCA to require that each financial regulator
consider the impact a proposed bank merger or a bank's acquisition of a
nonbank might have on U.S. and global financial stability.' 5 ' The
financial stability analysis contained in these orders reveals that the
Federal Reserve is still operating, on balance, under institution-first
systemic risk management assumptions.152
Under the Board's financial stability standard, the primary point
of analysis reflects the institution-first approach to macroprudential
systemic risk mitigation.153 The Board's order focuses most extensively
on the impact "the resulting firm" would have on "financial
intermediation or financial market functioning[.]"l 54 If the Board
determines that the failure of the resulting firm would inflict "material
damage on the broader economy," ss the Board may deny a bank's
application to purchase a nonbank under § 1843.156 Following the
Board's logic, reducing risk to the system requires ex ante protection of
an individual firm's risk profile so that the resulting firm does not inject
too much risk into the system. 157 To this point, the Board continued,
"[t]his kind of damage could occur in a number of ways, including
seriously compromising the ability of other financial institutions to
conduct regular-course-of-business transactions or seriously disrupting
the provision of credit or other financial services."15 8
The Board measures the risk a resulting firm will pose to the
149. IMF FRAMEWORK, supra note 77 (laying out results of 2011 International Monetary
Fund (IMF) survey of international implementation of macroprudential policies).
150. See Bernanke Statement, supra note 2, at 1-4.
151. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012).
152.

See CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 24-27.

153. See id. at 24-27.
154. See id. at 23.
155. Id.
156. Id. (discussing the how the Board will balance "public benefits" against "material
damage" in considering applications).
157.

See id.

158.

See CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 23.
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health of the financial system both quantitatively and qualitatively.'"' It
then evaluates a BHC's proposal to purchase a nonbank using at least
five quantitative metrics: (1) size; 160 (2) substitutability; 161 (3)
interconnectedness;1 62 (4) complexity;1 63 and (5) cross-border
activity.164 The ultimate measure of financial stability is derived from
an analysis of these "factors in combination."' 65 Considered against the
backdrop of the current macroprudential debate detailed in the
foregoing discussion, the Board's orders under the BHCA demonstrate
that the Federal Reserve has adopted an institution-first approach to
macroprudential regulation under § 1843.
1. Financial Stability Metric One: Size
The Board evaluates size using an integrated approach to
systemic risk management that privileges the institutional approach.
For instance, the Board measures size by aggregating available financial
data of the BHC and the proposed acquisition in order to predict the
new entity's "systemic footprint." 66 The use of size as a measure of
systemic risk reflects an institution-first integrated approach because the
starting point of the analysis is the size of the resulting institution.' 67
159. Id. at 24.
160. Id. at 24-25 ("An organization's size is one important indicator of the risk that the
organization poses to the financial system.").
161. Id. at 25-26 ("The Board has examined whether Capital One or FSB engages in any
activities that are critical to the functioning of the USFS and whether there would be
adequate substitute providers that could quickly step in to perform such activities should the
combined entity suddenly be unable to do so as a result of severe financial distress.").
162. Id. at 26 ("The Board has examined data to determine whether financial distress
experienced by the combined entity could create financial instability by being transmitted to
any other institutions or markets within the U.S. banking or financial system.").
163. Id. at 26-27 ("The Board has considered the extent to which the combined entity
would contribute to the overall complexity of the USFS.").
164. See CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 27 ("The Board has examined the
cross-border activities of Capital One and FSB to determine whether the cross-border
presence of the combined organization would create difficulties in coordinating any
resolution, thereby significantly increasing the risk to U.S. financial stability.").
165. Id. ("The Board has assessed the foregoing factors individually and in combination
to determine whether interactions among them might mitigate or exacerbate risks suggested
by looking at them individually.").
166. Id. at 24.
167. Id. at 25 ("Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365,
requires the Board to subject all bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of
$50 billion or more, and any nonbank financial company designated by the FSOC for
supervision by the Board, to enhanced prudential standards in order to prevent or mitigate
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Furthermore, the Board states that size is a "helpful indicator[] of
systemic risk" and that size must also go to "systemic impact of a
transaction."' 68
Systemic risk is frequently addressed in the context of
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)-those BHCs
whose assets exceed $50 billion and nonbank financial companies
designated as systemically significant by the FSOC. 169 The size of an
institution is correlated to the risk a banking combination poses to the
entirety of the system.' 70 Accordingly, Congress has established a
unique regulatory framework for those corporations designated as
SIFIs.' 7 1
2. Financial Stability Metric Two: Substitutability
The Board evaluates substitutability using an institution-first
integrated approach to systemic risk management. Substitutability
analysis requires that the Board determine whether the BHC or the
acquired entity is critical to the operations of the U.S. Financial System
(USFS), and "whether there would be adequate substitute providers that
could quickly step in to perform such activities should the combined
entity suddenly be unable to do so because of severe financial
distress."172 Much like the Board's analysis under the size factor, the
first step of this analysis starts at the level of the institution and then
works its way out to the impact of that institution on the market as a
whole. First, the Board will evaluate the activities of the individual
risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the severe distress or
failure of these firms.").
168. See id. ("These measures are helpful indicators of potential systemic risk; however,
the fact that Congress also requires the Board to review the potential systemic impact of a
transaction that does not reach these limits likely indicates they were not meant to substitute
for an analysis of size as part of the systemic risk factor.").
169. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 12
U.S.C. § 5464 (2012).
170. Lamont Black et al., The Systemic Risk of European Banks During the Financial
2012),
Crisis
1
(Nov.
and
Sovereign
Debt
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2181645 ("We empirically measure
systemic risk as a hypothetical insurance premium to cover distressed losses in the European
banking system, based on the inputs of credit default swap (CDS) spreads, equity return
correlations, and total liabilities of individual banks, which capture the main characteristics
of systemic risk-default risk, interconnectedness, and size.").
171. 12 U.S.C § 5464 (2012).
172. CAPrrAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 25.
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entities to assess whether their activities "are critical to the functioning
of the USFS."'
Second, the Board will assess feasibility of another
provider stepping into the shoes of the combined entity were the
combined entity suffers "severe financial distress." 74 Both steps
require the Board to assess the fundamentals of the individual institution
and that institution's impact on the broader financial system.' 75
3. Financial Stability Metric Three: Interconnectedness
Interconnectedness analysis requires that the Board "determine
whether financial distress experienced by the combined entity could
create financial instability by being transmitted to any other institutions
or markets within the U.S. banking or financial system."' 76
Interconnectedness analysis also requires that the Board assess the
systemic risk potential with a focus that begins with the institution. 7 7
Under this framework, the Board must envision a scenario whereby the
combined entity's isolated weakness would risk spreading financial
contagion.' 7 8 The Board's interconnectedness analysis is decidedly
firm-centric.179 In Capital One, the Board focused on the resulting
firm's "use of wholesale funding, as a share of USFS wholesale funding
usage" and the resulting firm's share of "intra-financial system assets
and liabilities."18 0
This is a paradigm, bottom-up approach to
macroprudential risk management because the Board's analytical
starting point is the firm itself.1 8' Next, the Board inquires as to the
impact that individual use will have on the market as a whole.182
4. Financial Stability Metrics Four and Five: Complexity and CrossBorder Activity
Complexity and cross-border activity reflect the market-first
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 25.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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approach to macroprudential systemic risk management.' 8 3 Complexity
analysis requires that the Board consider "the extent to which the
combined entity would contribute to the overall complexity of the
USFS."l 84 The metric's overarching methodology is market-based
because it requires that the Board assess how this firm will add to the
overall complexity of the system.' 8 5 However, complexity analysis also
reflects the integrated perspective because the analysis requires that the
Board "consider[] whether the complexity of the combined entity's
assets and liabilities would hinder its timely and efficient resolution in
the event it were to experience financial distress."l 86 This consideration
occurs primarily at the level of the institution. 87
Similarly, cross-border activity is another instance where the
Federal Reserve is adopting a market-first approach to macroprudential
policy under § 1843.188 Cross-border activity analysis requires that the
Board "determine whether the cross-border presence of the combined
organization would create difficulties in coordinating any resolution,
thereby significantly increasing the risk to U.S. financial stability." 89
Cross-border analysis requires that the Board assess systemic risk
potential from an integrated vantage point. 190 The analysis requires that
the Board apply the institutional approach and asses the feasibility of
resolving a multinational or international BHC.191 The Board must also
take a market-based approach and assess how deeply the resolution of
that individual institution will impact financial stability in the United
States. 192
In the aggregate, the Board's approach to macroprudential
policy under the BHCA is orientated towards the institutional
approach.193
Three
metrics-size,
substitutability,
and
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 26-27.
CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 26.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 27; 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012).
CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 27.

190.

Id.

191. Id. ("The Board has examined the cross-border activities of Capital One and FSB
to determine whether the cross-border presence of the combined organization would create
difficulties in coordinating any resolution, thereby significantly increasing the risk to U.S.
financial stability.").
192. Id. at 27.
193. See id. at 24-27; 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012).
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interconnectedness-clearly start with the institution and then move
their way out towards the marketplace.1 94 The two remaining metricscomplexity and cross-boarder activity-appear to be more market

orientated. 195
It is important to acknowledge that the Federal Reserve's
conservative application of macroprudential financial stability measures
is, from one vantage point, smart policy because macroprudential
policies are in their infancy and, thus, are fundamentally untested.196
The Board's macroprudential approach preserves all options and
"[takes] into account all factors that are relevant to a transaction."1 9 7 A
preserving options approach may be preferable because the Board may
refine its approach without the attendant hassle of upsetting precedent.
It also allows the Board to continually update the framework. However,
the effectiveness of regulation that preserves this kind of flexibility does
not find much support in the literature.' 9 8 The Federal Reserve's prefinancial crisis "discretionary policy actions ... consequently failed to
address the underlying problem and allowed it to fester." 99 Preserving
regulatory discretion, for example can lead to decisions that hurt the
market because "regulators commonly opt for policy discretion based
on sometimes overly rosy views of favorable outcomes for banks'
market valuation." 200 And, a fortiori, similar distortions may be able to
follow in the sphere of regulatory financial stability analysis.
V. CONCLUSION:

INTERCONNECTIVITY IN FULL

Considered in concert, the Federal Reserve's explicit treatment
of interconnectedness under the BHCA and the implicit assumptions
about interconnectedness associated with an institution-first approach to
194.

CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supranote 11, at 24-26.

195. Id. at 26-27.
196. Galati & Moessner, supra note 69, at 13 ("[R]esearch on macroprudential policy is
still in its infancy and appears far from being able to provide an analytical underpinning for
policy frameworks.").
197. See CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 24 ("A financial institution that can be
resolved in an orderly manner is less likely to inflict material damage to the broader
economy.").
198. See, e.g., VANHooSE, supra note 94, at 46 (citing Gary Stem & Ron Feldman, The
Squam Lake Report: Observationsfrom Two Policy Professionals,57 J. MONETARY ECON.
988, 988-1004 (2010)).
199. See id.
200.

See id.
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systemic risk management suggest that the Federal Reserve's approach
to financial stability under the BHCA should be revised to address the
these considerations.
First, the Federal Reserve's explicit approach to
interconnectedness does not adequately account for the kind of risks
that attach to small institutions operating in concert. 20 1 The Federal
Reserve's explicit interconnectedness analysis measures institutional
interconnectedness as a function of its exposure to the market as a
whole, through measures of the resulting firm's "use of wholesale
funding, as a share of USFS wholesale funding usage" 202 and the
resulting firm's share of "intra-financial system assets and
liabilities." 203 Because small depository institutions are unlikely to
trigger additional review under the current framework, the Federal
Reserve is potentially blind to the systemic risk a small firm poses to the
health of the financial system when considered in concert with
similarly-situated institutions.2 04 Thus, the Federal Reserve should
change the denominator for resulting firm's interconnectivity from the
market as a whole to a denominator that captures the resulting firm's
interconnectivity among smaller, similarly-situated firms.
Second, the Federal Reserve should revise its approach to
macroprudential analysis to reflect the importance of interconnectivity
in the modem economy.205
As the financial crisis so clearly
206
demonstrated, risk is relational
and, as the Chairwoman Yellen
concluded while still a Federal Reserve Governor, "[c]ontagion is
significantly more likely at higher levels of connectivity." 207
Institution-centric macroprudential policy, unfortunately, does not
capture systemic risk posed by the interconnections between banks and
other financial institutions as effectively as a market-centric,
macroprudential framework. 208 Thus, the Federal Reserve should adopt
a market-based approach to macroprudential systemic risk management.

201.
202.
203.
204.

See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 33, at 25-26.
CAPITAL ONE ORDER, supra note 11, at 26.
Id.
See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 33, at 25-26.

205. See K.C. Chakrabarty, supra note 34.
206. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 198.
207. See Yellen, supra note 29 ("Contagion is significantly more likely at higher levels
of connectivity.").
208. See generally Hockett, supra note 5.
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Chairwoman Yellen has the opportunity to make a bold
statement concerning the Federal Reserve's application of modem
systemic risk principles to its understanding of the role of
interconnectivity and risk. The Federal Reserve's approach to financial
stability under the BHCA should be revised to address the explicit and
implicit weaknesses regarding interconnectedness. The U.S. and global
financial systems might very well benefit from the change.
CHRISTOPHER S. DWIGHT

